U. S. Journalize the entry to record the identification of the customers bad debt. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged. The Justices disagreed only as to whether the plaintiffs had carried their burden of proof at trial. So, too, would be a case in which a State concentrated a dispersed minority population in a single district by disregarding traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions. See App. Id., at 141-142; see also Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 370-371 (1975) (annexation that reduces percentage of blacks in population satisfies 5 where postannexation districts "fairly reflect" current black voting strength). b. I nevertheless agree that the conscious use of race in redistricting does not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the effect of the redistricting plan is to deny a particular group equal access to the political process or to minimize its voting strength unduly. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICE O'CONNOR DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT. Our different approaches to equal protection in electoral districting and nondistricting cases reflect these differences. In 1991, a group of white voters in North Carolina challenged the state's new congressional district map, which had two "majority-minority" districts. In that regard, it closely resembles the present case. The majority first took judicial notice of a fact omitted from appellants' complaint: that appellants are white. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 1237, 1261, n. 96 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). It involves, instead, an attempt to equalize treatment, and to provide minority voters with an effective voice in the political process. Our focus is on appellants' claim that the State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. 9 As has been remarked, "[d]ragons, bacon strips, dumbbells and other strained shapes are not always reliable signs that partisan (or racial or ethnic or factional) interests are being served, while the most regularly drawn district may turn out to have been skillfully constructed with an intent to aid one party." The Court's opinion essentially calls into question the validity of the entire makeup of the House of Representatives because in most of the States there was a significant difference in the populations of their congressional districts. Gomillion is consistent with this view. 4 The Court's opinion suggests that African-Americans may now be the only group to which it is unconstitutional to offer specific benefits from redistricting. wide, the majority concluded that appellants had failed to state an equal protection claim. In our view, the District Court properly dismissed appellants' claims against the federal appellees. Constitutional Principle. It is particularly ironic that the case in which today's majority chooses to abandon settled law and to recognize for the first time this "analytically distinct" constitutional claim, ante, at 652, is a challenge by white voters to the plan under which North Carolina has sent black representatives to Congress for the first time since Reconstruction. Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. See Part V for a discussion of these dissenting opinions. e., an intent to aggravate "the unequal distribution of electoral power." Finally, like New York, North Carolina reacted by modifying its plan and creating additional majority-minority districts. See, e. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616-617 (1982); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). The shapes of the two districts in question were quite controversial. The facts of this case mirror those presented in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO), where the Court rejected a claim that creation of a majority-minority district violated the Constitution, either as a per se matter or in light of the circumstances leading to the creation of such a district. In 1993, about 20% of the state population identified as Black. This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy. Another of the weapons in the States' arsenal was the racial gerrymander-"the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries for [racial] purposes." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495 (1954). The Attorney General objected to the plan on the ground that the second district could have been created to give effect to minority voting strength in the State's south-central to southeastern region. Hirabayas hi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). Washington Post, Apr. The Attorney General objected to the plan on the ground that a second district could have been created to give effect to minority voting strength in the State's south-central to southeastern region. Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. The Court expresses no view on whether appellants successfully could have challenged a district such as that suggested by the Attorney General or whether their complaint stated a claim under other constitutional provisions. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for federal appellees. Indeed, racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to burden or benefit the races equally. The company raises all equity from outside financing. The majority, however, accepted the District Court's finding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the districts were in fact drawn on racial lines. Though they might be dissatisfied at the prospect of casting a vote for a losing candidate-a lot shared by many, including a disproportionate number of minor-, its black citizens with respect to their exercise of the voting franchise from approximately 1900 to 1970 by employing a poll tax [and] a literacy test. To help you find the subject, ask, Who answered? Gaffney, 412 U. S., at 752, n. 18; see ante, at 647. 3 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires a covered jurisdiction to demonstrate either to the Attorney General or to the District Court that each new districting plan "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race[,] color, or [membership in a language minority.]" 92-357 . Because appellants here stated such a claim, the District Court erred in dismissing their complaint. a. 408 (E.D.N.C. It rejected the argument that race-conscious redistricting to benefit minority voters is per se unconstitutional. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339. But even assuming that it does, there is no question that appellants have not alleged the requisite discriminatory effects. Ruth Shaw and four other white North Carolina voters filed suit against the U.S. attorney general and various North Carolina officials, claiming that race-based redistricting violated, among other provisions, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. As Wright demonstrates, when members of a racial group live together in one community, a reapportionment plan that concentrates members of the group in one district and excludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes. 339." Ruth Shaw and four other white North Carolina voters filed suit against the U.S. attorney general and various North Carolina officials, claiming that race-based redistricting violated, among other provisions, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. This new plant is expected to generate aftertax cash flows of$9.4 million in perpetuity. 1300 (1966). These unarguable facts, which the Court devotes most of its opinion to proving, give rise to three constitutional questions: Does the Constitution impose a requirement of contiguity or compactness on how the States may draw their electoral districts? They did not even claim to be white. It is evident to me, however, that what North Carolina did was precisely tailored to meet the objection of the Attorney General to its prior plan. Northbound and southbound drivers on 1-85 sometimes find themselves in separate districts in one county, only to "trade" districts when they enter the next county. Const., Amdt. Limited by its own terms to cases involving unusually shaped districts, the Court's approach nonetheless will unnecessarily hinder to some extent a State's voluntary effort to ensure a modicum of minority representation. By perpetuating stereotypical notions about members of the same racial group-that they think alike, share the same political interests, and prefer the same candidates-a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. They also contend that recent black electoral successes demonstrate the willingness of white voters in North Carolina to vote for black candidates. The black population is relatively dispersed; blacks constitute a majority of the general population in only 5 of the State's 100 counties. We noted probable jurisdiction. I fail to see how a decision based on a failure to establish discriminatory intent can support the inference that it is unnecessary to prove discriminatory effect. SHAW v. RENO (1993) AP U.S. Government and Politics Study Guide IMPACT The decision in Shaw v. Reno led to nationwide changes after the 2000 Census. The Act proved immediately successful in ensuring racial minorities access to the voting booth; by the early 1970's, the spread between black and white registration in several of the targeted Southern States had fallen to well below 10%. They contend that the State's black population is too dispersed to support two geographically compact majority-black districts, as the bi-. 92-357. Written and curated by real attorneys at Quimbee. The essence of the majority's argument is that UJO dealt with a claim of vote dilution-which required a specific showing of harm-and that cases such as Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), and Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), dealt with claims of racial segregation-which did not. Appellants further argue that if 2 did require adoption of North Carolina's revised plan, 2 is to that extent unconstitutional. But it did not purport to overrule Gomillion or Wright. But "[a] number of states refused to take no for an answer and continued to circumvent the fifteenth amendment's prohibition through the use of both subtle and blunt instruments, perpetuating ugly patterns of pervasive racial discrimination." can imagine would be the preservation of "sound districting principles," UJO, 430 U. S., at 168, such as compactness and contiguity. In whatever district, the individual voter has a right to vote in each election, and the election will result in the voter's representation. Oral Argument - April 20, 1993; Opinions. See Tr. Chief Judge Voorhees agreed that race-conscious redistricting is not per se unconstitutional but dissented from the rest of the majority's equal protection analysis.
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